The Arab Spring: How soon will foreign investors return? by Barbour, Paul Antony et al.
 Columbia FDI Perspectives 
Perspectives on topical foreign direct investment issues by 
the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment 
No. 67   May 7, 2012 
Editor-in-Chief: Karl P. Sauvant (Karl.Sauvant@law.columbia.edu) 
Managing Editor: Jennifer Reimer (jreimer01@gmail.com) 
 
 
The Arab Spring: How soon will foreign investors return? 
by 
Paul Antony Barbour, Persephone Economou, Nathan M. Jensen, and Daniel Villar* 
 
The events of the Arab Spring have dramatically increased the risk perceptions of foreign 
investors. In directly affected countries, these events led to disruptions in economic 
activity including plummeting tourism and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, all of 
which negatively impacted economic growth. While the economic impact was uneven 
across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, for the region’s developing 
countries the growth rate assumption underpinning survey analysis in the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency’s (MIGA’s) World Investment and Political Risk Report 
for 2011 was 1.7%.1 How much will these developments affect future FDI? 
 
The financial crisis in 2008 led to declines in aggregate FDI flows into MENA. As events 
unfolded in 2011, FDI flows into MENA plummeted further in the directly affected 
countries; for example, in the first quarter of 2011, FDI inflows turned negative in both 
Egypt and Tunisia, which were two of the most affected countries.2 The World Bank has 
forecasted FDI flows into MENA to decline in 2012, but to grow again in 2013. Over the 
medium and longer term, the region’s economic and demographic factors will continue to 
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attract market-seeking foreign investors, more so under conditions of improved 
governance.  
 
The findings of a foreign investor survey jointly undertaken in 2011 by the World Bank’s 
MIGA and the Economist Intelligence Unit3 found that the turmoil did have a significant 
impact on corporate investors’ investment intentions concerning MENA: a quarter of 
investors put their plans on hold, while others reconsidered (18%), canceled (11%) or 
withdrew investments (6%). Only just below a third did not alter their investment plans 
(see the supporting data below). Despite heterogeneity among the different countries in 
MENA, on balance, the turmoil has stressed existing investments and dampened plans for 
expansions and new investments. While there are differences between investors in 
extractive industries, these differences do not affect the overall results from a 
representative sample of investors worldwide. Thus, the findings are probably less 
negative than they would be if the oil sector was excluded.4 
 
Some investors in the countries directly affected by the civil disturbances, especially 
investors in the energy and service sectors, have reported suspending operations.5 All of 
this has been amplified by the worsening state of domestic economies, as current account 
deficits and budget deficits have widened, private capital flows have weakened, inflation 
has risen, and production and investment have declined. Political violence -- especially 
civil disturbance and to a lesser extent war and terrorism -- ranked particularly high as the 
risk of most concern as did governments’ abilities to honor their sovereign financial 
obligations. 
 
The survey found greater confidence from multinational enterprises (MNEs) investing in 
stable democracies relative to stable authoritarian regimes. This pattern has also emerged 
in the region: just over half of the firms surveyed would invest in MENA, assuming that 
there is at least a year of stability under a democratic government. Nearly half of the 
firms in the survey said they would decrease investments should there be significant and 
persistent instability, even in the presence of democracy. Only 8% of firms would 
increase their investments under such circumstances. The worst-case scenario would be a 
period of prolonged and significant instability, where nearly half of the firms surveyed 
would substantially decrease investments. In the event of a non-democratic regime that 
nevertheless succeeds in stabilizing the country for at least a year, 44% of the firms 
surveyed claimed that they would not change their plans for investment, essentially 
adopting a “wait and see” approach. This lesson is also supported by evidence from the 
private political risk insurance market, which stressed the difficulty in selling coverage in 
seemingly stable authoritarian regimes, but saw the demand for coverage in such 
countries (both in MENA and worldwide) rise as a result of the events in MENA. 
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 The findings of the survey provide evidence of both pitfalls and possibilities arising from 
the Arab Spring. Investors will return fairly quickly once stability returns given the vast 
opportunities in the region. Most investors would prefer this stability to be under a 
democratic regime. Thus there is long-run optimism that, if political transitions in the 
region are democratic and coupled with political stability, the Arab Spring could increase 
FDI and help contribute to economic development in the region. 
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Appendix 
Figure 1. FDI flows into MENA (US$ million) 
 
Source: World Bank Data Catalogue, retrieved in October 2011 
Note:  Developing oil importers: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, West Bank and Gaza 
Developing oil exporters: Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Yemen 
High income oil exporters: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman, UAE 
 
Figure 2. Effect of the recent turmoil in MENA on investment plans in the region 
(Percent of respondents) 
 
Source: MIGA, World Investment and Political Risk 2011 (World Bank, Washington DC). 
 
Figure 3. Effect of the recent turmoil in MENA on political risk perceptions in the region, 
by type of risk (Percent of respondents) 
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Source: MIGA, World Investment and Political Risk 2011 (World Bank, Washington DC). 
